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This brief is filed in behalf of both the respon-
dent, Wayne D. Criddle, State Engineer, and the re-
spondent, Milford Primary Rights Pumpers Associa-
tion. Reference to the trial record will be design a ted 
herein by the letter R and to appellants' brief by the 
letter B. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondents desire to supplement the state-
ment of facts contained in the appellants' brief. 
With respect to Claim No. 551, Perrine How-
arth, the record shows that a survey of the land claimed 
to have been irrigated was made by the State Engineer 
in 194 2 and again in 19 52 and there were no indica-
tions, on the ground, of irrigation of the land described 
in Claim No. 551 (R. 2, 9). Mr. Hubert Lambert. 
Deputy State Engineer, testified as follows: 
"Q. Do you recall the ground as you 
saw it in 1942? 
''A. Yes, I recall that particular ground, 
the cross roads crossing the line of our particu-
lar level survey and also for our hydrographic 
survey. 
''Q. And do you recall seeing any indi-
cations of the ground irrigation, in 194 2? 
''A. As I recall that \vell, the well was 
in complete disrepair at that time, but it was 
one of several on that tract, I think we actually 
found some casings further over in the 40 acre 
tract at that particular time, there was no evi-
dence of a house which had been lived in on the 
place at the time we saw it in '42. but the well 
was completely caved and any evidence of 
ditches or irrigated land at that time was not 
apparent. 
"Q. l"'he land covered with brush? 
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''A. As I recall this land wasn't too 
heavily covered with brush, I think it was 
rather sparsely covered with brush, and that 
would have been rabbit brush, largely, rather 
than the greasewood, as I remember.'' 
On cross-examination Mr. Lambert admitted 
that the conditions related above won't preclude irri-
gation "perhaps 14 years earlier" (R. 10). 
The record contains similar evidence with respect 
to some of the other claims involved in the appeal. It 
is apparent from the reading of the entire record that 
the wells on which claims were filed were used for a 
short period of time for the purpose of "proving up 
on the land" and were not again used for 25 to 35 
years. The casings were permitted to deteriorate and 
the wells caved in, ditches were abandoned and the 
land grew up in brush (R. 10). 
As indicated by the record, the evidence was pre-
sented to the court without written pleadings and the 
court made its ruling without argument. No oppor-
tunity was given to contend that the water rights had 
been lost by intentional abandonment. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE FINDINGS THAT ONLY TEN ACRES 
WERE IRRIGATED IS SUSTAINED BY 
THE EVIDENCE. 
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POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS THE INTER-
LOCUTORY ORDER ON THE THEORIES 




THE FINDINGS THAT ONLY TEN ACRES 
WERE IRRIGATED IS SUSTAINED BY 
THE EVIDENCE. 
It is well settled that the findings of the trial 
court must be sustained on appeal if supported by sub-
stantial evidence. It is not the province of this court to 
put itself in the place of the trier of fact and decide on 
the weight of the evidence. Mayer vs. Criddle. 3 55 P. 
2d 64, _ _ Utah 2d __ . The finding that only ten 
acres of land were irrigated and is supported by the 
testimony of Mr. Goodwin (R. 5-7) and by the testi-
mony of Mr. Lambert (R. 9, 10); the trial court was 
fully justified in accepting their testimony. 
It appears that this point argued by the appel-
lants is entirely out of order because the court denied 
Claim No. 5 51 in toto. If this denial was error the 
case should be remanded with a direction to the trial 
court to take further evidence on this question. The 
problems as to whether there \vere ten or twenty acres 
irrigated is not properly before this court. 
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POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS THE INTER-
LOCUTORY ORDER ON THE THEORIES 
OF BOTH NON-USE AND ABANDON-
MENT. 
It is admitted that no water from the wells in-
volved in the various claims has been used for several 
decades. The evidence is uncontradicted that the use 
in each case was only for a period of one to three years. 
The wells were then permitted to deteriorate and cave 
in, further cultivation of the land was discontinued, 
the ditches disappeared by the passage of years and the 
land which it is claimed was formerly irrigated has 
been permitted to grow up in brush (R. 10). There 
is no evidence whatever of any intention by the orig-
inal claimants or their successors to resume use of the 
\Vater. 
Even when the underground water claims were 
filed in the State Engineer's Office and Statements of 
Water Users Claims were filed pursuant to the pending 
general adjudication suit, the land remained in its 
abandoned condition and no improvements were made 
on any well involved in the appeal. 
On May 15, 1945, the abandonment and non-
use statute (now 73-1-4, U. C. A. 1953) was 
amended to include underground water, and still this 
condition continued. No use \Vhatever was made of 
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these rights for the statutory non-use period of five 
years. The first action taken concerning these claims 
was the filing of protests to the proposed determina-
tion of the State Engineer. This occurred from June 
through October 19 50, more than five years after the 
amendment. Throughout the period from May, 1945, 
to May, 1950, there was absolutely no indication of 
any intent to resume use of these waters. The land 
and the water rights remained in the same condition as 
that described by Mr. Lambert above, and that condi-
tion in itself indicates an intention to abandon the 
water right. 
Some fifteen years had expired at the time of the 
hearing on these protests since the amendment of sec-
tion 73-1-4, and there is not one word of testimony 
of any overt act indicating an intention to resume use 
during that time. 
Appellants assert (B. 23-24) the court's periodic 
extensions of time in which to file protests to the Pro-
posed Determination of the State Engineer shield them 
from effect of the non-use statute. However, it must 
be noted that the protest extensions were of general 
application and could not be said to have any effect 
upon a totally separate and specific section requiring 
certain action of water users. 
The non-use statute clearly states failure to use 
a water right for a five year period causes such water 
right to revert to the public. The general extension of 
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time in the matter of the proposed determination can 
no more excuse the performance of this duty by these 
parties than it would excuse any other duties imposed 
by separate acts of the Legislature. 
Indeed, the Legislature provided a specific means 
whereby the five year period of the non-use statute 
may be extended. The enactment of such legislation 
itself indicates the Legislature felt that without such 
provision there was no means whereby the effect of a 
five year non-use could be avoided. It is well settled 
that the Legislature is presumed to enact useful and 
effective legislation. 
Section 73-1-4, contains specific provision for 
extension of the non-use period and it is submitted 
that by the plain language of the statute the method 
(application of extension of time to the State Engineer 
for resumption of use) is the exclusive method of ex-
tending the non-use period. There is, of course, no 
showing by the appellants that any such application 
was made. 
The appellants have produced no testimony that 
they were prepared to and would have resumed use 
except for the denial of their claim and right in the 
proposed determination. Further, there is no showing 
that the State Engineer actually denied the use of water 
or, indeed, had undertaken the distribution of water 
of the Escalante Valley between April, 1949, and May 
15, 19 50. There is nothing in the state statutes indi-
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eating that during the pendency of a general adjudi-
cation proceeding before or after the filing of the pro-
posed determination, the non-use statute becomes in-
operative. The language of Section 73-1-4, permits no 
such implication. 
The significant point to be remembered is that 
the appellants have not used this alleged water right 
for almost 30 years and have specifically failed to per-
form any overt act during the five year period from 
May, 1945, to May, 1950, which would indicate ac-
tual resumption of use or even an intention to resume 
use. 
Section 73-1-4, as amended, provides water may 
be lost through either non-use or through abandon-
ment. The lack of action on the part of appellants 
amounts in fact to an abandonment of any claim they 
may have had apart from the non-use provisions. As 
the Colorado court has said: 
"Abandonment is a question of fact. and 
must be proven. Abandonment of an appropri-
ation consists in nonuse coupled with an inten-
tion of the owner not to repossess himself of 
the use of the water. Such intention may be 
express or implied. Where nonuse is shown 
which is continued for a considerable length of 
time, and the acts of the owner show no inten-
tion of resuming the use. it may be sufficient to 
imply the presence of an intention to abandon 
the right, and. tvhen legitimately implied be-
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comes proof, as a fact, of abandonment." (Em-
phasis added. ) 
Arnold, et al. vs. Roup, 15 7 P. 206. 
Surely the failure to use water for some 30 years, the 
permitting of ditches and wells to fill and become in-
operative and in fact obliterated, is sufficient lack of 
activity to infer an intent to abandon such rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents submit the evidence and the law 
fully support and sustain the actions of the trial court 
and that said actions should therefore be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. J. SKEEN, 
Attorney for Respondent 
Milford Primary Pump Users, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General, 
RICHARD R. BOYLE, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Wayne D. Criddle. 
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